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Abstract—A smartphone user’s personal hotspot (pH) allows
him to share cellular connection to another (e.g., a traveler) in
the vicinity, but such sharing consumes the limited data quota
in his two-part tariff plan and may lead to overage charge. This
paper studies how to motivate such pH-enabled data-plan sharing
between local users and travelers in the ever-growing roaming
markets, and proposes pricing incentive for a data-plan buyer
to reward surrounding pH sellers (if any). The pricing scheme
practically takes into account the information uncertainty at the
traveler side, including the random mobility and the sharing
cost distribution of selfish local users who potentially share their
pHs. Though the pricing optimization problem is non-convex,
we show that there always exists a unique optimal price to
tradeoff between the successful sharing opportunity and the
sharing price. We further generalize the optimal pricing to the
case of heterogeneous selling pHs who have diverse data usage
behaviors in the sharing cost distributions, and we show such
diversity may or may not benefit the traveler. Lacking selfish
pHs’ information, the traveler’s expected cost is higher than that
under the complete information, but the gap diminishes as the
pHs’ spatial density increases. Finally, we analyze the challenging
scenario that multiple travelers overlap for demanding data-plan
sharing, by resorting to a near-optimal pricing scheme. We show
that a traveler suffers as the travelers’ spatial density increases.
Index Terms—Roaming markets, personal hotspot, data-plan
sharing, pricing mechanism, information uncertainty.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Background and Motivation
Roaming is the ability of customers to use their mobile
devices outside the geographical coverage area provided by
their normal network operator [2]. As the penetration of smart
mobile devices increases fast, the volume of the global data
roaming market has grown by more than sixfold in the past
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five years [2]–[5]. Accordingly, the revenue of data roaming
is expected to increase to US$50 billions in revenues by 2019
(see [5], [6]). Travelers may suffer a “bill shock”, and data
roaming is typically expensive as compared to the domestic
markets’ two-part tariff data plans for local users. To reduce
the roaming cost, a traveler may enjoy data services by ac-
cessing to the public (free) WiFi hotspots. However, free WiFi
hotspots are limited in coverage and they usually concentrate
on the public service areas (e.g., airports, stations, malls, and
public libraries) to avoid formidably high deployment cost for
full coverage. For example, even for a populous city such as
Singapore, the WiFi coverage percentage is only 35% [7]. It
is urgent to find economically viable approaches for providing
travelers with ubiquitous wireless data services.
With the recent techonology advancements, cellular-enabled
iPhones and Android phones can now set up personal hotspots
(pHs) to share there cellular data connections with nearby
wireless devices (e.g., phones, laptops, and tablets) [8]. The
physical coverage of a pH ranges about hundreds of feet
like WiFi and is expected to keep increasing. However, the
development of this user-initiated data-plan sharing still lacks
a clear business model and a local selfish user is only willing
to share the pH connection with his own devices [26]. As such,
it is important to propose incentive schemes for pH-enabled
data-plan sharing in a broad popularity.
A key problem to hinder the development of such data-plan
sharing is the sharing cost. A selling user’s sharing consumes
his monthly data quota in his two-part tariff plan and may lead
to overage charge. After subscribing to a data-plan denoted
by (Q,P0, β), a local user is given a monthly data quota Q
at a fixed lump-sum fee P0 and should pay for overage data
beyondQ at a costly unit price β. In addition, such pH sharing
consumes the local user’s finite energy in battery storage and
also requires the selling user to stay during the sharing period,
incurring another waiting cost. To facilitate user-initiated data-
plan sharing via pH, we aim to design a reward-based pricing
scheme for a traveler to fairly cover the pH sharing cost. As
shown in Fig. 1, a traveler T opportunistically demands data
connection from nearby pHs (if any), by announcing a sharing
price $p (ex ante) as a reward via short-range communications.
The nearby pHs then respond to accept or not based on their
private costs. Finally, the traveler T selects one pH for cellular
connection and pays reward $p to the activated pH.1
However, this optimal pricing design under information un-
certainty is challenging at the traveler side. Since the potential
pHs are generally moving, the traveler does not know the
1The terms “selling user” and “pH” are interchangeable in this paper.
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Fig. 1. A user-initiated data-plan sharing model with one traveler and personal
hotspots (pHs).
exact number of pHs in the sharing area. Furthermore, how to
estimate the private costs of pHs is another problem for the
traveler. Only a pH knows his own sharing cost, since that it
depends on the realized data usage in his two-part tariff plan.
In general, different pHs have different data usage behaviors
or cost distributions. The traveler would prefer to activate a pH
with low cost distribution, yet this screening is not doable for
ex ante pricing. Intuitively, one can expect that a high sharing
payment will provide a good chance for pH sharing but leave
a low sharing benefit to the traveler. This motivates our study
in this work.
B. Contributions
In this paper, we first develop a model for pH-enabled data-
plan sharing initiated by on-demand travelers and then find the
optimal pricing in different scenarios. Our main contributions
are summarized as follows.
• Pricing incentive for pH sharing under information un-
certainty: In Section II, to provide an incentive of data-
plan sharing to nearby pHs, we design a pricing scheme
for an on-demand traveler to reward pHs and reach a win-
win situation. The pricing scheme practically considers
the traveler’s information uncertainty about pHs, includ-
ing the mobile pHs’ random locations following a Poisson
point process (PPP) and their sharing cost distribution
under the two-part monthly tariff plans.
• Benchmark case under complete information: In Section
III, to provide a performance bound and evaluate the pro-
posed pH pricing schemes later, we investigate the social
optimum benchmark case under complete information,
where the pHs nearby are willing to report their locations
and private costs. Then the traveler pays and activates
the pH with the minimal cost. It shows that the traveler’s
expected cost decreases in both the pHs’ spatial density
and their residual data quota.
• Optimal pricing analysis for various pHs under infor-
mation uncertainty: In Section IV, the optimal price is
determined for the traveler to minimize his expected
cost after sharing. We first consider homogeneous pHs
whose statistics of monthly data usage are identical.
The globally optimal sharing price is derived for the
on-demand traveler. We show that the traveler’s final
expected cost is larger as compared with the case under
complete information and the gap diminishes with the
pH spatial density. Furthermore, we extend the optimal
pricing scheme to the case of heterogeneous pHs who
have different data usage statistics. The optimal price is
derived by comparing their diverse cost distributions and
targeting for the dominant pH type. This diversity may
or may not benefit the traveler.
• Optimal pricing for overlapping travelers: In Section V,
we further consider the scenario that a traveler may over-
lap with other travelers in demanding common pHs in the
considered area. To handle the non-tractable expression
of the expected cost for travelers, a lower bound of the
expected cost is pursued to obtain the near-optimal price
for coordinating all travelers. We show that each traveler
suffers from the increase of the travelers’ spatial density.
C. Related Work
It is noted that pricing incentive design has received increas-
ingly attentions for wireless networks [9], [10]. The works in
[11]–[13] surveyed some generic pricing and auctions schemes
for mobile crowdsourcing. Some recent works investigated the
pricing incentive in data trading and user cooperation in the
literature. For example, following game theory frameworks,
[14] and [15] studied the optimal pricing for static WiFi
hotspots (e.g., in a cafe) according to customer types and
network capacity. About mobile users’ data plan sharing, [16]
and [17] studied mobile data trading among users under the
central coordination of the wireless operator in the operator-
controlled secondary market. [18] further investigated the
pricing incentive to stimulate users’ relay cooperation for
energy saving purpose. [19] studied a network-controlled user-
provided connectivity system and derived the optimal hybrid
pricing-reimbursing policy to maximize the network revenue.
[20] considered utility maximization for peer-to-peer networks
based on a tit-for-tat incentive mechanism. Building on indirect
reciprocity game framework, [21] investigated cooperation
stimulation for cognitive networks. [22] proposed a credit
based mechanism for WiFi sharing community networks.
Leveraging the density and heterogeneity of wireless devices,
[23] proposed a new cognitive dynamic architecture for future
wireless networks to provide ubiquitous Internet connectivity
and developed a distributed matching algorithm for operators’
and users’ cooperation for data sharing. There are other
pricing schemes for non-tethering wireless network [24], [25],
where the time-dependent pricing for price-quality tradeoff is
analyzed.
Different from these operator-controlled data sharing net-
works, we investigate a user-initiated peer-to-peer network for
data trading via pHs without operators’ intervention. Note that
[26] investigated a user-initiated data-plan sharing scenario by
employing pHs, where users with diverse data usage trade
data plans and the wireless operator indirectly intervene with
such sharing to control overage charge. However, [26] assumed
3T
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Fig. 2. An illustrative example of pH-enabled data-plan sharing between traveler T and N pHs ((if any).
complete information for mobile data trading and did not take
into account user mobility and private cost in practice. Unlike
prior works, this paper studies an optimal pH pricing problem
under information uncertainty, where the traveler only has
partial information about pHs’ private locations and costs.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Consider a typical traveler T who wants to connect the
Internet. He can potentially buy data from any neighboring
pH within pH range (e.g., around 50 meters). The pH range
d is determined by traveler T’s quality of service (QoS)
requirement on the minimum received signal-to-interference-
plus-noise ratio (SINR) target γ > 0. One can equivalently
consider the minimum data rate. Note that the traveler’s
application is QoS-guaranteed type (e.g., video call), and he
perceives no service difference one beyond the SINR target.
Suppose traveler T is located at the origin. Let Λ(λ) = {y},
y ∈ R2, denote the coordinates of the pHs. Due to a collection
of pHs distributed in the space by the PPP Λ(λ) and they share
a common radio medium, the total power received at traveler
T from this collection of pHs is in essence a shot-noise field at
the origin. For ease of exposition, we consider a typical signal
propagation model accounting for large-scale path loss, and
all pHs employ a constant and identical power of Ptx without
power control. The SINR of traveler T at distance d from its
target pH is expressed as [31], [32]
SINR(d) =
PtxC0(d/r0)
−α
Id + σ2
, (1)
where C0 is a constant path loss value at reference distance
r0, α > 2 is the path loss exponent depending on the antenna
height and the signal propagation environment [36], and σ2
is the power of the additive noise at traveler T’s receiver.
In (1), the term Id ,
∑
y∈Λ(λ)\{bo} PtxC0(‖y‖/r0)−α is
the cumulative interference from all the other pHs (except
the target pH for traveler T at location b0) at distance ‖y‖
from traveler T. By using the null probability of a PPP,
the probability density function of ‖y‖ is then obtained
as f‖y‖(r) = 2πλr exp(−λπr2) for r ≥ 0. The Laplace
transform of the interference Id is [32]
LId(s) =
exp
(
− 2πλ
∫ ∞
d
(1− exp(−sPtxC0(r/r0)−α))rdr
)
. (2)
Based on (2), one can evaluate the interference value Id for
any pH range d.
To ensure SINR(d) ≥ γ, where γ is the minimum SINR
target, the maximum value of pH range d is given by
d =
(
PtxC0r
α
0
γ(Id + σ2)
) 1
α
. (3)
From (3), under a certain SINR target γ, it is expected that a
larger pH density imposes a stronger interference on traveler
T, thereby reducing the pH radius d of the sharing area. Note
that similar results of (1)–(3) can be obtained if a more general
fading channel is considered, where the received SINR and
maximum pH-range can be modified accordingly with a given
maximum outage probability and fading distribution [32], [36].
Note that once the average pH service quality is comparable
to the roaming of the cellular network, the traveler will still
choose the former service to avoid the high charge in the latter
roaming.
At the center of circle area A with radius d, traveler T can
access to the data service either by paying one activated pH
within the area A or by paying the local wireless network
operator (WNO). Denote by H the set of randomly appeared
pH number in the area A and N , |H|.
Let B be the volume of traveler T’s requested data to buy.
For traveler T, we denote p and C0 as his announced price to
pHs nearby and the roaming fee charged by the local WNO,
respectively. A selling pH will serve the demanding traveler
T within range d and the traveler T will try to activate and
connect to a pH within d. The pH-enabled data-plan sharing
procedure is illustrated in Fig. 2, and can be divided into three
phases:
• Traveler request phase: at the beginning, traveler T
broadcasts the data-plan sharing request message via
short range communications (e.g., bluetooth), where the
message contains the offered price p for the data volume
B.
• pH response phase: upon receiving the request, in this
phase each pH i ∈ H (if any) makes a decision to accept
or not and responds to traveler T.
• pH sharing phase: in this phase, if at least one positive
pH response message is received, then traveler T will
randomly select one of the positive pHs and pay p to
4establish the pH connection; otherwise, traveler T will
resort to the WNO by paying roaming fee C0 for data
volume B.
Note that we pursue pH data-sharing pricing optimization
with a fixed-volume data usage for traveler T in this paper.
This is reasonable for many inelastic applications, such as
file transfer [14]. Once the pH data connection is established
between the pH and the traveler, it requires that both the
traveler and the pH commit to stay within the distance of
d until the data sharing service of a certain data amount
(e.g., B) is completed. Thus, network change does not affect
the existing service linkage. On the other hand, the pHs are
moving in general and the private information of pHs (e.g.,
the number N and data-plan sharing costs) is not available
for traveler T ex ante in traveler request phase.
A. pHs’ models about mobility, cost and utility
To capture the nature of pH mobility, we assume that
the locations of pHs in target circle area A follow a two-
dimensional PPP with spatial density λ as in [30]. The average
number N = |H| of pHs in area A is λπd2, which increases
in the pH range d and the pH density λ. The probability mass
function (PMF) of N is then
Pr(N = n) =
(λπd2)n
n!
exp(−λπd2), n = 0, 1, · · · (4)
where Pr(X) denotes the probability of event X . Ideally,
traveler T wants to attract only one pH at minimum price but
may fail to attract none, depending on the cost distribution of
various pHs in sharing.
The data-plan sharing to traveler T will consume pH i’s
cellular data amount B for any i ∈ H. Suppose that pH i has
subscribed to an identical two-part tariff plan (Q,P0, β) from
the local WNO in the long run, where Q is the monthly data
quota, P0 is the fixed lump-sum fee, and β is the unit price
for overage data beyond Q. In practice, when each pH i ∈ H
predicts his monthly data usage xi, he will inevitably attach
an additive noise ∆i ∼ N (0, δ2) according to his subjective
estimation, where δ2 represents the estimation error variance.
For any pH i ∈ H, the monthly data usage xi is assumed to
be a Gaussian variable, i.e., xi ∼ N (µ, σ2), where µ and σ2
denote the mean and variance, respectively. By considering the
shared volume B with traveler T, the actual monthly usage is
xi + ∆i + B for any pH i ∈ H, which may be larger than
quota Q and hence incurs surcharge with rate β. Given xi
estimation, the (additional) cost for pH i, i ∈ H, after sharing
with traveler T is
Ci(xi) = E{β(xi +∆i +B −Q)+} − E{β(xi +∆i −Q)+}
=

0, if 0 ≤ xi ≤ Q−B
β(xi +B −Q), if Q−B < xi < Q
βB, if xi ≥ Q,
(5)
where (x)+ , max{x, 0} and the expectation E{·} is taken
over the estimation noise ∆i.
Define φ(x) and Φ(x) as the probability density function
(PDF) and the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of Gaus-
sian variable x, respectively. According to (5), the minimal
cost of pH i ∈ H for data-plan sharing is zero if his monthly
data usage xi plus the sharing data amount B is within the
monthly mean data quota Q, while the maximal cost is βB
if his monthly data usage xi is already larger than the data
quota Q. Based on (5) for random xi, we obtain the CDF of
the sharing cost Ci(xi) ≤ βB in the following lemma:
Lemma 2.1: For pH i ∈ H, the CDF of his additional cost
Ci(xi) incurred by traveler T’s data consumption B is given
by
Pr(Ci(xi) ≤ c) =
{
Φ( cβ +Q−B), if 0 ≤ c < βB
1, if c = βB.
(6)
Proof: See Appendix A.
As a return, pH i will receive a reward price p from traveler
T. The utility of pH i ∈ H via data-plan sharing is given by
Ui(xi) = p− Ci(xi). (7)
Reasonably, we assume that any pH i ∈ H has a reservation
utility ǫ > 0 that must be guaranteed to cover both the battery
consumption2 and the cost due to waiting time during the
connection between the pH and traveler T. In other words,
a pH i’s total cost for data sharing includes both the expected
data sharing cost Ci(xi) (may incur data overage) and the
energy consumption cost, as well as the waiting cost. Hence,
pH i accepts traveler T’s sharing request only if Ui(xi) ≥ ǫ.
The traveler has to buy data from the WNO at cost C0 if
the following two conditions hold:
• No pH exists in area A, i.e., N = 0;
• The utility of each pH i ∈ H in the non-empty set H is
smaller than ǫ, i.e., p− Ci(xi) < ǫ.
The realized cost for traveler T is given as
CT =
{
p, if ∃i ∈ H, p− Ci(xi) ≥ ǫ
C0, otherwise,
(8)
To ensure the mutual benefits of traveler T and pHs in this
user-initiated data-plan sharing, the offer price p by the traveler
T should satisfy
ǫ ≤ p ≤ C0, (9)
where the first inequality in (9) guarantees the utility to
increase of the pHs and the second inequality in (9) saves
the roaming cost for traveler T.
III. BENCHMARK CASE UNDER COMPLETE INFORMATION
In this section, we consider the ideal benchmark case
under complete information, where the set H and the private
information of pH i ∈ H (including the expected monthly
data usage xi and the expected cost Ci(xi) in sharing) is
available for traveler T. This case can happen when both
traveler T and the pHs belong to a cooperative community
(e.g., family members or friends) or pHs are altruistic by
reporting their locations and private costs accurately. This
case serves as a performance benchmark (lower bound for the
2How to quantify the transmission energy cost can be found in [28], where
the energy consumption depends on the transmission time and the volume of
transmission data.
5traveler’s offered price), when comparing to Sections IV and
V under incomplete information.
Under complete information, if pH set H is non-empty,
traveler T only offers a price to cover the reservation utility ǫ
plus the minimum cost among all pHs, i.e.,
p(N) = ǫ+min
i∈H
Ci(xi). (10)
Without loss of generality, we reorder the N pHs’ costs
according to C1 ≤ C2 ≤ . . . ≤ CN , where Ci is the ith
smallest pH sharing cost and depends on xi realization. Then
(10) reduces to
p(N) = ǫ+ C1. (11)
Based on Lemma 2.1, it follows that the CDF of C1 is [35]
Pr(C1 ≤ c) ={
1− (1− Φ( cβ +Q−B))N , if 0 ≤ c < βB
(1− Φ(Q))N , if c = βB. (12)
and the PDF of C1 is
fC1(c) =
∂
∂c
Pr(C1 ≤ c)
=
N
β
(
1− Φ( c
β
+Q−B))N−1Φ( c
β
+Q−B) (13)
for 0 ≤ c < βB.
Based on (12) and (13), we have the following lemma.
Lemma 3.1: Given the non-empty pH set (i.e., N ≥ 1), the
expected cost p(N) of traveler T is given by
p(N) = E{ǫ+ C1}
= ǫ+
∫ βB
0
(
1− Φ( c
β
+Q−B)
)N
dc, (14)
where the expectation is taken over any possible C1 with the
PDF in (13).
Proof: See Appendix B.
Lemma 3.1 shows that the traveler T’s cost p(N) is a de-
creasing function with respect to N ≥ 1 due to the fact that
Φ( cβ +Q− B) ∈ [0, 1] for 0 ≤ c ≤ βB. Further, denoted by
EC∗∗ the expected cost of traveler T over any possible pH
number N (including N = 0). Taking expectation of (14) over
random N , i.e., EC∗∗ = C0 × Pr(N = 0) +
∑∞
n=1 p(N) ×
Pr(N = n), we establish the following theorem with the use
of iterated expectation [34].
Theorem 3.1: The expected cost EC∗∗ of traveler T under
complete information is given by
EC∗∗ = ǫ+ (C0 − ǫ− βB) exp(−λπd2)
+
∫ βB
0
exp
(
λπd2
(
erfc
(
x/β+Q−B−µ√
2σ
)
− 2
)
2
)
dx,
(15)
where erfc(x) , 2√
π
∫ +∞
x e
−t2dt is a complementary error
function.
Proof: See Appendix C.
Due to the fact that the function erfc(x) decreases with x
and by checking the relationship between EC∗∗ and some key
parameters in Theorem 3.1, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 3.1: The traveler T’s benchmark (minimum)
cost EC∗∗ always increases with the sharing data amount B,
the roaming fee C0, and the overage charge unit price β for
the pHs. Meanwhile, EC∗∗ decreases with the pH density λ
and the pH leftover data amount Q− µ.
If B + µ ≤ Q, as σ2 increases,
exp
(λπd2(erfc( x/β+Q−B−µ√
2σ
)
−2
)
2
)
in (15) increases, i.e.,
pH’s mean usage µ plus the sharing data B is still within the
data quota Q. This indicates that the pH is more likely to
incur data overage with an increasing variance, and traveler
T has to increase its price or turn to paying roaming fee to
the WNO. On the other hand, if B + µ > Q, traveler T may
or may not benefit from the increasing σ2.
IV. TRAVELER’S OPTIMAL PRICING UNDER INFORMATION
UNCERTAINTY
In this section, we aim to optimize the traveler T’s pricing
under pH information uncertainty to minimize his expected
cost, which depends on pHs’ locations and cost distributions.
As in Section III, we focus on a typical traveler T and
assume he has no overlap demand with another traveler.
This is reasonable for many places less traveled, and will
be generalized in Section V to include overlapped travelers.
We first consider homogeneous pHs’ monthly data usage
to analyze the optimal price, and then extend to the more
challenging case of heterogeneous pHs’ usage behavior.
A. Pricing towards pHs of homogeneous data usage
Consider a homogeneous pH case, where the monthly data
usage xi ∼ N (µ, σ2) of pH i ∈ H is i.i.d. Gaussian distributed
with identical mean usage and variance among all pHs. To
derive the traveler’s expected cost, we first analyze the pHs’
acceptance or not on the traveler’s request.
1) The successful probability for motivating pH data shar-
ing: Denote by Phom(p|N) the probability for traveler T to
successfully attract a pH for data-plan sharing given the pH
set H. We then have
Phom(p|N) = 1−
(
1− Pr(p− Ci(xi) ≥ ǫ)
)N
, (16)
where Pr(p − Ci(xi) ≥ ǫ) is the probability that each pH
i ∈ H accepts the data sharing request from traveler T. Note
that Phom(p|N) in (16) equals zero if N = 0. Based on the
traveler T’s estimated PDF of pH i’s sharing cost Ci(xi) in (5),
the data-plan sharing probability Ω˜(p) of each pH is expressed
as
Ω˜(p) , Pr(p− Ci(xi) ≥ ǫ)
=

0, if p < ǫ
Ω(p), if ǫ ≤ p ≤ ǫ+ βB
1, if p > ǫ+ βB.
(17)
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Fig. 3. Illustrations of function EChom(p) for the homogeneous pHs.
where
Ω(p) , 1− 1
2
erfc
(p− ǫ+ β(Q −B − µ)√
2σβ
)

= 0, if p− ǫ ≤ β(B + µ−Q− 2√2σ)
∈ (0, 1), if p− ǫ ∈
(
β(B + µ−Q− 2√2σ),
β(B + µ−Q+ 2√2σ)
)
= 1, if p− ǫ ≥ β(B + µ−Q+ 2√2σ).
(18)
Base on (17) and (18), we obtain Ω˜(p) =
0, if p− ǫ < (β(B + µ−Q− 2√2σ))+
Ω(p), if p− ǫ ≥ (β(B + µ−Q− 2√2σ))+
and p− ǫ ≤ min{β(B + µ−Q+ 2√2σ), βB}
1, if p− ǫ ≥ min{β(B + µ−Q+ 2√2σ), βB}.
(19)
From (19), for any pH i ∈ H, we have the following cases:
• If p < ǫ + (β(B + µ − Q − 2√2σ))+, i.e., the sharing
price p is smaller than the given reservation utility plus
the minimal possible overage cost, the pH i ∈ H will
definitely reject the data sharing request.
• If ǫ+ (β(B + µ−Q− 2√2σ))+ ≤ p ≤ ǫ+min{β(B +
µ−Q+2√2σ), βB}, the probability in (18) shows that
one pH becomes positive in sharing data connection.
This sharing probability increases in the price p and his
expected leftover data Q − B − µ, but decreases in its
unit price β for overage data.
• If p > ǫ + min{β(B + µ − Q + 2√2σ), βB}, i.e., the
sharing price of traveler T is large enough to cover the
maximal possible overage cost ǫ+min{β(B + µ−Q+
2
√
2σ), βB}, any pH i ∈ H will accept the data sharing
request and sell data to traveler T.
Considering all the possibilities of N ≥ 0, let Phom(p) be the
expected probability for traveler T to successfully establish the
data connection via pH, which is a function of price p offered
by traveler T. By taking the expectation of Phom(p|N) over
any possible variable N , we have
Phom(p) =
∞∑
N=0
(
1− (Ω˜(p))N
) (λπd2)N exp(−λπd2)
N !
= 1− exp
(
−λπd2Ω˜(p)
)
. (20)
By substituting (19) into (20), it follows that Phom(p) =
0, if p− ǫ < (β(B + µ−Q− 2√2σ))+
1− e−λπd2Ω(p), if p− ǫ ≥ (β(B + µ−Q− 2√2σ))+
and p− ǫ ≤ min (βB,
β(B + µ−Q+ 2√2σ))
1− e−λπd2 , if p− ǫ ≥ min (βB,
β(B + µ−Q+ 2√2σ)),
(21)
which also has three cases as (17) and in general increases
with p.
2) Traveler T’s pricing problem: Denote by EChom(p)
the expected cost function of price p for traveler T in the
homogeneous pH sharing service. Depending on the response
of pHs (if any), the traveler T has either realized cost p or
roaming fee C0 in (9). Thus, it follows that
EChom(p) = p× Phom(p) + C0 × (1 − Phom(p))
=

C0, if p− ǫ < (β(B + µ−Q− 2
√
2σ))+
E˜Chom(p), if p− ǫ ≥ (β(B + µ−Q− 2
√
2σ))+
and p− ǫ ≤ min(βB,
β(B + µ−Q+ 2√2σ))
C0 + (p− C0)
×(1− e−λπd2), if p− ǫ ≥ min (βB,
β(B + µ−Q+ 2√2σ)).
(22)
where E˜Chom(p) , C0 + (p − C0)
(
1− e−λπd2Ω(p)
)
.
By checking the first-order and second-order derivatives of
E˜Chom(p), it is verified that E˜Chom(p) is a convex function
with respect to p ∈ [β(B + µ−Q− 2√2σ),min{β(B + µ−
Q+2
√
2σ), βB}] (see Appendix D). In the following, we are
interested in minimizing traveler T’s expected cost EChom(p)
for ǫ ≤ p ≤ C0. Mathematically, we formulate the following
optimization problem
min
p
EChom(p) (23a)
s.t. ǫ ≤ p ≤ C0. (23b)
As shown in Fig. 3, there is one minimal optimum, denoted
by pˆ, for EChom(p), and pˆ may be smaller than ǫ. Formally,
7we state the following result on traveler’s data sharing pricing
facing the homogeneous pHs.
Theorem 4.1: Facing the homogeneous pHs, traveler T
should decide the optimal sharing price p∗0 as
p∗0 = max{ǫ, pˆ}, (24)
where pˆ is the solution to ∂E˜Chom(p)∂p |p=pˆ = 0, i.e.,
1− exp (−λπd2Ω(pˆ)) [1 + λπd2(C0 − pˆ)√
2πσβ
× exp
(
−
[ pˆ− ǫ+ β(Q −B − µ)√
2σβ
]2)]
= 0. (25)
Proof: See Appendix D.
Note that in Theorem 4.1, the optimal solution p∗0 in (24)
is decided to best tradeoff between the price and the sharing
probability. In particular, if B + µ ≤ Q, i.e., pH’s data quota
is larger than the sum of pH’s sharing data and the mean
data usage, pˆ is the unique solution to (25). Even for this
case, it is challenging to obtain pˆ in closed-form due to the
coupling of variables’ coupling in (25). We apply a bisection
search procedure to find the unique pˆ. On the other hand, if
B + µ > Q, the uniqueness of pˆ in (25) is not guaranteed. In
this case, one can compute the corresponding expected cost
under different price values via a one-dimensional exhaustive
search, and then select the best solution pˆ that returns the
minimal expected cost value. Similar to the benchmark case
in Section III, p∗0 decreases with the pH density λ and the data
quota Q for more data-plan sources, but increases with ǫ, µ,
and β. By checking the relationship between the optimal price
p∗0 and pH data usage variance σ
2, we establish the following
proposition.
Proposition 4.1: If B + µ ≤ Q, i.e., the pHs’ sharing data
amount B plus the expected data usage µ is within its data
quota Q, then the traveler’s expected cost EChom(p) increases
in the variance σ2 of the pHs’ data usage.
Proof: See Appendix E.
Based on Proposition 4.1, as intuitively expected in the case
of B + µ ≤ Q, an increase of the pH usage variance will
increase the chance of data overage beyond quota Q. Thus,
the traveler needs to pay more to justify such cost increase,
and its expected cost increases.
B. Pricing towards pHs of heterogeneous data usage
In this subsection, we extend the optimal pricing scheme to
the case of the heterogeneous pHs. Specifically, we consider
a set K , {1, . . . ,K} of pH types according to their monthly
data usage behaviors (e.g., light- and heavy-usage pH users).
Within the same pH type, any two pHs have the same mean
usage and variance, and they will subscribe to the same two-
part tariff data plan under the WNO.
1) The cost analysis for pHs’ data sharing: Now we extend
the system model in Section II to the heterogeneous pH case.
Denote by (Qk, P0,k, βk), i ∈ K, the two-part tariff data plan
under the WNO in the kth pH type, where Qk denotes the data
quota, P0,k denotes the fixed lump-sum fee, and βk denotes the
unit price of the overage data. Suppose again that each pH type
in the circular area A of radius d follows an independent PPP
with a given spatial density. Specifically, let λk and Hk denote
the spatial density and the appearance set of the kth pH-type,
respectively. Accordingly, Nk = |Hk| is a Poisson distributed
variable with mean λkπd
2. Let xk,i denote the monthly data
usage for any pH i ∈ Hk of the kth pH-type. Again, we
assume that each xk,i follows a Gaussian distribution, i.e.,
xk,i ∼ N (µk, σ2k), where the pH type indices are reordered
by accounting for both the mean and variance of pH data-
usage, i.e., 0 ≤ β1(B + µ1 −Q1 − 2
√
2σ1) ≤ . . . < βK(B +
µK − Qk − 2
√
2σK). Assume that the values µk’s and σk’s
can be estimated by checking the type-k pHs’ previous data
usage history.
Define Tk , ǫ+βk(B+µk−Qk−2
√
2σk) for any k ∈ K.
As will be revealed in Theorem 4.2, Tk servers as a threshold
price to incentivize any k-th pH type, i.e., only when traveler
T’s offered price p is larger than Tk, the pHs of the kth type
become interested in participating in such data-plan sharing
activity. By sharing data of volume B, the additional cost of
pH i ∈ Hk is expressed as
Ck,i(xk,i) =

0, if 0 ≤ xk,i ≤ Qk −B
βk(xk,i +B −Qk), if Qk −B ≤ xk,i ≤ Qk
βkB, if xk,i ≥ Qk,
(26)
where i = 1, . . . , Nk and k = 1, . . . ,K .
2) Traveler T’s pricing problem: Under any given Hk, k ∈
K, the probability for traveler T’s request to be successfully
accepted by pHs is3
Phet(p|H1, . . . ,HK) = 1−
∏
k∈K
∏
i∈Hk
Pr(p− Ck,i(xk,i) < ǫ)
= 1−
∏
k∈K
(1 − Ωk(p))Nk , (27)
which takes into account the distribution of any xk,i and
Ck,i(xk,i) in (26), and we follow a similar analysis as the
previous Section IV.A. Note that in (27), the function Ωk(p)
with respect to p ∈ [ǫ, βkB] is defined as
Ωk(p) , 1− 1
2
erfc
(
p− ǫ+ β(Qk −B − µk)√
2σkβk
)
= Pr(p− Ck,i(xk,i)), k ∈ K. (28)
Since that erfc(x) ≈ 2 for x ≤ −2 and erfc(x) ≈ 0 for x ≥ 2,
it follows that
Ωk(p)

= 0, if p−ǫβk +Qk −B − µk ≤ −2
√
2σk
∈ (0, 1), if |p−ǫβk +Qk −B − µk| ≤ 2
√
2σk
= 1, if p−ǫβk +Qk −B − µk ≥ 2
√
2σk,
(29)
for any k ∈ K, where ǫ ≤ p ≤ ǫ+ βB.
3Note that
∏
i∈Hk
Pr(p − Ck,i < ǫ) = 1 if Hk = ∅ without any pH
presence to possibly share, for k = 1, . . . ,K .
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Fig. 4. An illustration of function EChet(p) for K types of heterogeneous
pHs.
Considering all the possible pH sets Hk’s, the probability
for traveler T’s data sharing request to be successfully accepted
by a pH is then
Phet(p) = 1−
K∏
k=1
∞∑
Nk=0
(1− Ωk(p))Nk (λkπd
2)Nk
Nk!
e−λkπd
2
=

0, if p ≤ T1
1− exp(−∑kj=1 λjπd2Ωj(p)), if Tk ≤ p ≤ Tk+1,
k = 1, . . . ,K − 1
1− exp(−∑Kj=1 λjπd2Ωj(p)), if p ≥ TK .
(30)
As a result, traveler T’s expected cost EChet(p) in data sharing
is expressed as
EChet(p) = p× Phet(p) + C0 ×
(
1− Phet(p)
)
=
C0, if p ≤ T1
C0 + (p− C0)(1− e−
∑k
j=1 λjπd
2Ωj(p)), if Tk ≤ p ≤ Tk+1,
k = 1, . . . ,K − 1
C0 + (p− C0)(1− e−
∑K
j=1 λjπd
2Ωj(p)), if p ≥ TK .
(31)
We next formulate the traveler T’s expected cost minimization
problem as
min
p
EChet(p) (32a)
s.t. ǫ ≤ p ≤ C0, (32b)
which is more involved than problem (23) with homogeneous
pHs. Note that EChet(p) is a piecewise convex function of
p under the condition of B + µk ≤ Qk for any k ∈ K (see
appendix F). Denote p∗het as the optimal solution to (32).
To solve (32), we first denote p∗k as the solution of
∂gk(p)
∂p |p=p∗k = 0, k ∈ K, i.e.,
1− exp
(
−
k∑
j=1
λjπd
2Ωj(p)
)[
1 +
k∑
j=1
λjπd
2(C0 − p)√
2πσjβj
× exp
(
− (p− ǫ+ βj(Qj −B − µj)√
2σjβj
)2
)]
= 0, (33)
where gk(p) , C0+(p−C0)
(
1−exp (−∑kj=1 λjπd2Ωj(p))),
k ∈ K. Note that solving (33) for the heterogeneous pH case
is also involved as solving (25) for the homogeneous pH case,
and it is challenging to obtain the optimal p∗k in a closed form.
Similarly, one can turn to numerical approach for searching
for the optimal solution p∗k. Fig. 4 illustrates the possible cost
curves of the traveler T’s expected cost EChet(p) for the K
types of heterogenous pHs under different values of C0.
Note that the first-type pHs (i.e., light pHs) are more willing
to accept the data-plan sharing request from the traveler than
the second type pHs (i.e., heavy pHs) since that the light pHs
admit smaller data-sharing cost than the heavy ones. When C0
is large, traveler T tries to attract the first k types of pHs in
data-plan sharing, by designing a large price p∗k. It is shown
that in the case of C0 ≤ Tk, k ∈ K, the heavy pHs from the
kth to the Kth types will not consider data sharing due to
higher cost than roaming fee.
Formally, we now establish the theorem on the optimal
sharing price phet for traveler T to minimize his expected cost
to attract heterogeneous pHs as follows.
Theorem 4.2: Facing the heterogeneousK pH types, traveler
T decides the optimal sharing price p∗
het
by targeting different
groups of pHs:
• For C0 ≤ T1, i.e., C0 ≤ ǫ+ β1
(
B+µ1 −Q1− 2
√
2σ1
)
,
then the optimal price is p∗
het
= C0, since none of pHs
will accept the data-plan sharing and traveler T has to
resort to the WNO.
• For Tk ≤ C0 ≤ Tk+1, i.e., ǫ + βk
(
B + µk − Qk −
2
√
2σk
) ≤ C0 ≤ ǫ+βk+1(B+µk+1−Qk+1−2√2σk+1),
for any k = 1, . . . ,K − 1, then the optimal price to
minimize EChet(p) is p
∗
het
= p∗k. This implies that
traveler T targets for the first k types of pHs in data
sharing.
• For C0 ≥ TK , i.e., C0 ≥ ǫ+βK
(
B+µK−QK−2
√
2σK
)
,
then all the K pH types are involved in data-plan sharing
and the optimal price is p∗
het
= p∗K .
Proof: See Appendix F.
Theorem 4.2 tells a threshold sharing price Tk to incentivize
the pHs of the kth type. When the roaming fee C0 for the
traveler is smaller than the threshold, the traveler should design
such a reward to attract (or incentivize) the pHs of the first
(k− 1)th pH types. On the other hand, when the roaming fee
C0 is still larger than the threshold, the traveller will refer to
Tk+1 for the optimal price targeting at the first k pH types.
V. EXTENSION OF PRICING FOR OVERLAPPED TRAVELERS
In this section, we consider the coexistence of possibly
multiple travelers in the area A of radius d, where multiple
travelers request data-plan sharing from the common pool
of pHs. On the behalf of all travelers in this pH-sharing
platform, we aim to study the optimal pricing for all travelers
to minimize their total expected costs in pH data-plan sharing.
Intuitively, as there are more travelers, we need to decide
a larger uniform price in the data-plan sharing platform for
attracting more pHs to share.
We focus on a typical traveler T in the circle area A of
radius d. He also face a random number of other M ≥ 0
travelers requesting pH connection. To capture the mobility of
these travelers, we assume that the number M of overlapped
9travelers follows an independent PPP with spatial density λt >
0. The PMF of M is then given by
Pr(M = m) =
(λtπd
2)m
m!
exp
(−λtπd2) , m = 0, 1, · · ·
(34)
The data sharing scheme in Fig. 2 also applies here, where
each traveler offers a uniform price p decided centrally by the
sharing platform to pHs and we consider that each pH i ∈ H
with p − Ci(xi) ≥ ǫ can reply to serve at most one traveler
due to capacity limit.
A. Analysis of pHs’ sharing probability
For ease of exposition, we consider homogeneous pH case
and an identical two-part tariff data plan for all the pHs in pH
setH in this section. Denote by Ny the random number of pHs
satisfying the participation condition of p−Ci(xi) ≥ ǫ, where
Ny ≤ N . Conditioned on the presence of arbitrary Ny pHs in
the vicinity, the probability for traveler T to be accepted and
served by pHs is min{1, Ny/(M + 1)}. The “min” operation
is adopted to ensure that the accepted probability is equal to
1 in the case of Ny > M +1. As a result, given N and M in
the area A of our interest, the probability for the overlapping
traveler T to be served successfully is
Pmul(p|N,M) =
0, N = 0∑N
Ny=1
min
{
1,
Ny
M+1
} (
N
Ny
)
(Ω(p))
Ny (1− Ω(p))N−Ny ,
N ≥ 1,
(35)
where Ω(p) = Pr(p−Ci(xi) ≥ ǫ) as in (18). In the following,
we focus on the reasonable range [ǫ, βB] of optimal p, and
omit the two trivial cases of Pr(p − Ci(xi) ≥ ǫ) = 0 and
Pr(p− Ci(xi) ≥ ǫ) = 1 for p < ǫ and p > βB, respectively.
Taking expectation of (35) over any possible pH number
N , we denote by Pmul(p|M) the probability for traveler T to
establish the pH connection in the area A under the given M
travelers nearby. Readily, it follows that
Pmul(p|M) =
∞∑
N=0
Pmul(p|N,M)
(λπd2)N exp
(−λπd2)
N !
=
∞∑
N=1
N∑
Ny=1
min
{
1,
Ny
M + 1
}(
N
Ny
)
(Ω(p))Ny
× (1 − Ω(p))N−Ny (λπd
2)N exp
(−λπd2)
N !
.
(36)
Taking further expectation of Pmul(p|M) over the random
overlapped traveler numberM , the successful pH data-sharing
probability for traveler T is given by
Pmul(p) =
∞∑
M=0
Pmul(p|M)
(λtπd
2)M exp
(−λtπd2)
M !
, (37)
which is difficult to simplify due to the operation
min{1, Ny/(M + 1)} in each summation term.
λt
λΩ(p0
*)
p0
*
෤݌
Ω-1(λt/λ)
λ
pmul
*
C0
ε
0
Fig. 5. An illustration of the optimal price p∗
mul
with respect to the nearby
travelers’ density λt in approximate problem (42).
Readily, it holds that min{1, Ny/(M + 1)} ≤ 1 and
min{1, Ny/M+1} ≤ Ny/(M+1) for any possible Ny value
in the summation (36). Then, the original cost objective in
(37) now increases to two upper bounds PUB1
mul
(p) and PUB2
mul
(p)
via these two replacements for any Ny value, respectively.
Otherwise, the discontinuous “min” operation kept for any
possibleNy value makes (37) difficult to analyze and optimize.
Specifically, the first upper bound PUB1
mul
(p) is obtained by
choosing min{1, Ny/(M + 1)} = 1 in each summation term
in (35), i.e.,
P
UB1
mul
(p) ,
∞∑
M=0
∞∑
N=1
N∑
Ny=1
(
N
Ny
)
(Ω(p))Ny (1− Ω(p))N−Ny
× (λπd
2)N exp(−λπd2)
N !
(λtπd
2)M exp(−λtπd2)
M !
= 1− exp (− λΩ(p)πd2). (38)
In (38), it is assumed that a low traveler density case (i.e.,
λt is small) where pH supply is sufficient for traveler de-
mand. On the other hand, for the high traveler density case,
the second upper bound PUB2
mul
(p) is obtained, by choosing
min{1, Ny/(M+1)} = Ny/(M+1) in each summation term
in (35), i.e.,
P
UB2
mul
(p) ,
∞∑
M=0
∞∑
N=1
∑N
Ny=1
Ny
(
N
Ny
)
(Ω(p))Ny (1− Ω(p))N−Ny
M + 1
× (λπd
2)N exp(−λπd2)
N !
(λtπd
2)M exp(−λtπd2)
M !
=
λΩ(p)
(
1− exp(−λtπd2)
)
λt
. (39)
In (39), it is assumed that pH supply is not enough to meet
the traveler demand. Note that the detailed derivations of these
two upper bounds are relegated to Appendix G. We denote λ∗t
as the solution of PUB1
mul
(p) = PUB2
mul
(p), i.e.,
1− exp(−λΩ(p)πd2) = λΩ(p)
(
1− exp(−λ∗tπd2)
)
λ∗t
. (40)
It is verified that λ∗t = λΩ(p) in (40), which implies that the
two upper bounds PUB1
mul
(p) and PUB2
mul
(p) become identical when
the traveler density λt is equal to the expected density λΩ(p)
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of pHs who are willing to share data. Since that the pH sharing
probability Ω(p) in (18) increases with p, we jointly propose
a tighter upper bound of PUB
mul
(p) = min{PUB1
mul
(p),PUB2
mul
(p)}. In
particular, we approximate Pmul(p) in (37) as
P
UB
mul
(p) =
{
1− exp(−λΩ(p)πd2), if λt < λΩ(p),
λΩ(p)(1−exp(−λtπd2))
λt
if λt ≥ λΩ(p).
(41)
B. Traveler T’s pricing for cost minimization
We aim to minimize the typical traveler T’s expected cost,
i.e., EC(p) = Pmul(p) × p + (1 − Pmul(p)) × C0, which
is equivalent to minimizing all the (M + 1) travelers’ total
expected cost. As Pmul(p) and EC(p) are not tractable, we
turn to an approximate optimization problem by using PUB
mul
(p)
in (41) and a lower bound of EC(p):
min
p
P
UB
mul
(p)× p+ (1 − PUB
mul
(p))× C0 (42a)
s.t. ǫ ≤ p ≤ C0. (42b)
Denote by p∗
mul
the optimal solution to the approximate prob-
lem (42). Since PUB
mul
(p) depends on the nearby traveler density
λt, we next discuss the following three regimes for solving
(42).
1) Low traveler density regime (0 ≤ λt ≤ λΩ(p∗0) with
p∗0 given in Theorem 4.1): This regime includes sufficient pH
supply for travelers, and is similar to Theorem 4.1 without
traveler overlap. The traveler T only needs to consider the pH
response without coordination with other travelers. In this case,
P
UB
mul
(p) = PUB1
mul
(p) and p∗0 is the optimal solution to problem
(42). Note that p∗mul = p
∗
0 is independent of λt as shown in
Fig. 5.
2) Medium traveler density regime (λΩ(p∗0) ≤ λt ≤ λ):
In this regime, the average traveler demand is more than the
shared pH supply at traditional price p∗0, and the traveler T
needs to increase price p for minimizing PUB2
mul
(p) × p + (1 −
P
UB2
mul
(p))× C0 until λt = λΩ(p).
Lemma 5.1: Facing a medium traveler density regime (i.e.,
λΩ(p∗0) ≤ λt ≤ λ), the optimal data sharing price p∗mul for
(42) is
p∗mul = Ω
−1(λt/λ), (43)
where Ω−1(x) is an inverse function of Ω(x) in (18). This
price p∗mul decreases in the pH density λ and increases in the
overlapped traveler density λt (see Fig. 5).
Proof: See Appendix H.
3) High traveler density regime (λt > λ): In this regime,
it always holds that λt > λΩ(p) due to Ω(p) < 1 and
the pH supply is sufficient to meet travelers’ demand. The
approximated cost for traveler T is always PUB2
mul
(p)× p+(1−
P
UB2
mul
(p))× C0, which is given by
EChigh(p) , C0 + (p− C0)λΩ(p)(1 − exp(−λtπd
2))
λt
.
(44)
Lemma 5.2: Facing a high traveler density regime (i.e., λt >
λ), the optimal price to minimize the expected cost is obtained
as p∗
mul
= p˜ (see Fig. 5), where p˜ is independent of λt and is
the unique solution to
∂EChigh(p)
∂p |p=p˜ = 0, i.e.,
1− 1
2
erfc
( p˜− ǫ+ β(Q −B − µ)√
2σβ
)
+
p˜− C0√
2πσβ
exp
(
−
[ p˜− ǫ+ β(Q −B − µ)√
2σβ
]2)
= 0.
(45)
Note that it is challenging to obtain the closed-form of the
solution p˜ to (45). Again, one resorts to numerically find the
value of p˜ by implementing a bisectional search procedure.
By summarizing the above results, we have the following
proposition.
Proposition 5.1: In the overlapped traveler pricing problem
in (42), the optimal price p∗mul is
p∗mul =

p∗0 in (24), if 0 ≤ λt ≤ λΩ(p∗0)
Ω−1(λtλ ), if λΩ(p
∗
0) < λt ≤ λ
p˜ in (45), if λt > λ.
(46)
C. Extension to the case for one pH sharing data with multiple
travelers
Suppose that the support number of a pH for sharing is
q ≥ 1. Then we need to consider all the possible matchings
between all pH connections and travelers in the same area and
there are many possible connection-traveler combinations, as
not q connections of a pH will be shared successfully. For a
pH, its final estimation of sharing cost needs to aggregate all
the possible costs incurred by all the connections subject to the
same monthly data quota, and such quota-sharing correlation
among connections is very involved for computing the total
cost. Alternatively, we propose a more tractable way via
decomposition approximation of such connections, by treating
each pH i ∈ H as a number q of identical and independent sub-
pHs. Each sub-pH ji ∈ {i(1), . . . , i(q)} is then subscribed to
an equally partitioned data-plan of (Qi/q, P0/q, βi) and only
cares for its own cost for sharing decision. Then for each sub-
pH ji, the data sharing cost and sharing probability can be
obtained similarly as (26) and (36), respectively. Then we can
still derive the optimal pricing by just considering the q sub-
pHs’ independent responses as in Theorem 4.2 for final pricing
computation. It is interesting to note that a pH i (especially
facing a big data request of amount B from the traveler) may
not want to activate all q connections due to thinned quota
Qi/q of each connection to meet B. That is, pH i ∈ H may
only open a subset of connections to center the data resource.
VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS
A. Monopoly Traveler Case
In this subsection, we evaluate the proposed incentive pric-
ing scheme in the homogeneous and the heterogeneous pH
cases, as well as the benchmark cost for the social optimum
under complete information. In the simulations, the pH range
is set as d = 30 meters (m).
Fig. 6 shows the traveler T’s expected cost versus the homo-
geneous pH spatial density λ under different reservation utility
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Fig. 7. The optimal price announced by traveler T versus the pH density on
an hour-of-day basis.
values, where C0 = $3, B = 0.2 GB, µ = 1.7 GB, and σ
2 =
0.01. The same two-part tariff plan (2 GB, $17, $0.013/MB)
is set for all the pHs. It is corroborated that the social optimum
cost EC∗∗ under complete information is a lower bound for
the proposed ones under incomplete information, and the cost
gap becomes smaller as λ increases. It is observed in Fig. 6
that the traveler T’s expected cost decreases as λ increases,
close to the reservation utility ǫ under either complete or
incomplete information. As expected, the sharing price is
below bounded by ǫ, and a larger λ implies more pHs nearby,
which leads to a high probability for the traveler to incentivize
pHs at a lower sharing price.
Fig. 7 shows the optimal price p∗0 announced by traveler T
versus the pH density λ on an hour-of-day basis. By following
the usuage patterns in [27], during the night (9 p.m.–7 a.m.),
we set the pH density λ to follow a uniform distribution λ ∈
[0.1, 0.5]× 10−3 unit per square meter (unit/m2), and for the
day (8 a.m.–8 p.m.), the pH density is set to follow a uniform
distribution λ ∈ [0.5, 2]× 10−3 unit/m2. The pHs’ reservation
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Fig. 8. The traveler T’s expected cost versus ∆µ under different monthly
data quotas for pHs.
utility is set as ǫ = 0.5 and the other parameters are identical to
those in Fig. 6. It is observed in Fig. 7 that a larger pH density
λ value corresponds to a smaller price p∗0 value, and vice versa.
This is expected since that the traveler could benefit from the
data resource from a large number of pHs in the sharing area,
thereby offering a smaller price for data sharing. In addition,
Fig. 7 shows two distinct periods roughly corresponding to day
and night, and have low and high prices for traveler T. This
is expected since that a significantly high pH density appears
in day time than that in night for sharing with the traveler.
Fig. 8 shows the traveler T’s expected cost versus the mean
difference ∆µ between the light and the heavy pHs under
different monthly data quotas for all the pHs, where µ1 =
µ−∆µ/2, µ2 = µ+∆µ/2, the light and the heavy pH densities
are λ1 = λ2 = λ/2 = 2.5 × 10−4, the reservation utility is
ǫ = $0.2, and the remaining parameters are set the same as
those in Fig. 6. It is observed that the expected cost is about
EChet(p
∗) = $2.2 for the homogeneous pHs at Q = 1.8 GB,
while the expected cost EChet(p
∗) for the heterogeneous pHs
first decreases in∆µ and then remains unchanged. By contrast,
at Q = 2 GB, the expected cost EChom(p
∗) is about $1.05
for the homogeneous pHs, while EChet(p
∗) first increases in
∆µ and then remains unchanged for the heterogenous pHs.
This is expected that, when pHs with a limited data quota
(e.g., small Q), the traveler could benefit from the diverse of
the pH data usage since the sharing cost reduces for the light
pHs; on the other hand, with a large data quota, the traveler
may not benefit from the diverse of the pH data usage due to
the increasing of the sharing cost for the heavy pHs.
It is interesting to observe in Fig. 8 that, when ∆µ becomes
large, both the traveler’s expected cost with Q = 1.8 GB and
that with Q = 2 GB converge to a fixed value EChet(p
∗) =
$1.58 for the heterogeneous pHs. The reason is as follows. For
the very diverse heterogeneous pHs (i.e., when ∆µ becomes
large), the traveler rewards the light pHs with a fixed price ǫ
and the heavy pHs with a fixed price (ǫ + βB), respectively;
thus the traveler’s expected cost is independent with the pH’s
monthly data quota Q in this case.
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B. Overlapping Travelers Case
In this subsection, we consider pH data sharing in the
overlapping travelers case. Specifically, the identical two-part
tariff plan (2GB, $17, $0.013/MB) and the reserved utility
ǫ = $0.5 are set for all the pHs in the area A. The data usage
statistics are also set to be identical for all the pHs with mean
µ = 1.8 GB and variance σ2 = 0.01. The data roaming fee is
set to be C0 = $3 and the data usage amount B = 0.29 GB
for each traveler. We set the pH-range and the pHs’ spatial
density as d = 30 m and λ = 10−3 unit/m2, respectively.
Fig. 9 shows the expected cost for traveler T in pH data
sharing versus the nearby travelers’ density λt. It is observed
that both the optimal and the approximate expected costs
increase as λt increases. It is also observed that in Fig. 9,
when 4 × 10−4 ≤ λt ≤ 10−3, the approximate expected cost
based on the PUB
mul
(p) is slightly higher than the optimal one;
in the small and large λt regimes, the approximate approach
achieves a close performance as the optimal one. It suggests
that one can safely evaluate the minimal expected cost with
P
UB
mul
(p) in the overlapping travelers case with a high traveler
density.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we investigated the optimal reward-based pric-
ing problem in opportunistic pH data-plan sharing to reach a
win-win situation. It was established that the benchmark social
optimum under complete information. Taking into account
the random mobility and the cost distribution of selfish pHs
nearby, the optimal price was derived to minimize the trav-
eler’s expected cost facing the homogeneous pHs, and further
extended to the case of heterogeneous pHs. Lacking selfish
pHs’ information and cooperation, the traveler’s expected cost
is higher than that under the complete information, but the gap
diminishes as the pH spatial density increases. It was shown
that the traveler may or may not benefit from the diversity of
pHs’ data usage behavior. As an extension, the overlapped-
traveler pricing is investigated by resorting to a tractable
lower bound approximation. The (near-)optimal sharing price
is efficiently determined and serves as a safe approximation
especially in large pH density case. We show that the optimal
price increases with the density of travelers. Numerical results
evaluated the effectiveness of the proposed schemes.
As a future direction, we will pursue a more general pH data
sharing pricing scheme by allowing the traveler to adjust his
required data amount B at the same time for the elastic traffic
applications (such as web browsing) [14]. Another interesting
research direction for pH data-plan sharing in roaming market
is based on auction mechanisms (e.g., Vickrey-Clarke-Groves
(VCG) auction), where pHs (if any) first announce their costs
to the traveler and then traveler decides to activate which pH
for data sharing.
APPENDIX
A. Proof of Lemma 2.1
First consider the case of c = βB. According to (5),
the range of Ci(xi) is [0, βB]. Hence, it always holds that
Ci(xi) ≤ βB, i.e., Pr(Ci(xi) ≤ βB) = 1.
Next, based on (5), if 0 ≤ xi ≤ Q − B, then Ci(xi) = 0
and we have
Pr(Ci(xi) = 0) = Pr(0 ≤ xi ≤ Q−B)
=
∫ Q−B
0
Φ(xi)dxi
= Φ(Q−B). (47)
According to (5), for Q−B < xi < Q, it holds that Ci(xi) =
β(xi + B − Q). By setting Ci(xi) = c for 0 < c < βB, we
have xi = c/β +Q−B. Hence, under given 0 < c < βB, it
follows that
Pr(Ci(xi) ≤ c) = Pr
(
xi <
c
β
+Q−B)
=
∫ c
β+Q−B
0
Φ(xi)dxi
= Φ
( c
β
+Q −B). (48)
Based on (47) and (48), the probability of Ci(xi) = 0 becomes
identical to that of Ci(xi) ≤ c for 0 < c < βB. Hence,
it is immediate that Pr(Ci(xi) ≤ c) = Φ( cβ + Q − B) for
0 ≤ c < βB. Until now, Lemma 2.1 is proved.
B. Proof of Lemma 3.1
Under the given pH set, it is required to obtain the expected
value of p(N) = ǫ + E{C1}, where the expectation is taken
over any possible C1. With (12) and (13), we derive E{C1}:
E{C1} =
∫ βB
0
xfC1(x)dx + βB × Pr(C1 = βB)
=
∫ βB
0
xd
[
1− (1 − Φ(x
β
+Q−B))N
]
+ βB(1− Φ(Q))N
= x[1− (1− Φ(x
β
+Q−B))N ]
∣∣∣βB
0
−
∫ βB
0
[1− (1− Φ(x
β
+Q− B))N ]dx+ βB(1 − Φ(Q))N
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= βB
[
1− (1− Φ(Q))N ]− βB
+
∫ βB
0
(1 − Φ(x
β
+Q−B))Ndx+ βB(1 − Φ(Q))N
=
∫ βB
0
(1− Φ(x
β
+Q−B))Ndx, (49)
where the third equality of (49) holds by following the inte-
gration by parts. It thus follows Lemma 3.1 and the expected
cost of traveler T under given N ≥ 1 pHs is given by (14).
C. Proof of Theorem 3.1
Based on Lemma 3.1 and considering all the possibilities
of N (including N = 0), the expected cost for traveler T is
given by [34]
EC∗∗ = C0 × Pr(N = 0) +
∞∑
n=1
p(N)× Pr(N = n), (50)
where p(N) is obtained in Lemma 3.1. For (50), with the PDF
of N , we have the following equality chain:
EC∗∗ = C0e−λπd
2
+
∞∑
n=1
(
ǫ+
∫ βB
0
(
1− Φ(x
β
+Q−B))n)
× (λπd
2)n
n!
exp(−λπd2)dx
= C0e
−λπd2 + ǫ(1− exp(−λπd2))
+
∫ βB
0
∞∑
n=1
(1 − Φ(x
β
+Q−B))n (λπd
2)n
n!
exp(−λπd2)dx
= ǫ+ (C0 − ǫ) exp(−λπd2) + exp(−λπd2)
×
∫ βB
0
[
exp
(
λπd2(1− Φ(x
β
+Q−B)))− 1]dx
= ǫ+ (C0 − ǫ− βB) exp(−λπd2)
+
∫ βB
0
exp
(λπd2(erfc(x/β+Q−B−µ√
2σ
)− 2)
2
)
dx, (51)
where the second equality in (51) follows from switching
the summarization and the integration operations, and the last
equality in (51) holds from the fact 1−Φ(x) = erfc(x/√2)/2.
D. Proof of Theorem 4.1
First, consider the case of EChom(p) = E˜Chom(p) for p ∈
[pth1, pth2], where pth1 , ǫ + β(B + µ − Q − 2
√
2σ) and
pth2 , ǫ+min{β(B+µ−Q+2
√
2σ), βB}. To this end, we
establish the convexity of E˜Chom(p) of p under the condition
of B + µ ≤ Q.
Lemma 7.1: Suppose that B + µ ≤ Q. The function
E˜Chom(p) is a convex function of p ∈ [pth1, β(B + µ−Q+
2
√
2σ)].
Proof: This lemma can be verified by checking its posi-
tiveness of the second-order derivative of E˜Chom(p). At first,
the first-order derivative of E˜Chom(p) is expressed as
E˜C
′
hom(p) = 1− exp
(− λπd2Ω(p))(1
+
λπd2(C0 − p)√
2πσβ
exp
(
−
[ p−ǫ
β +Q−B − µ√
2σ
]2))
.
Based on E˜C
′
hom(p), the second-order derivative of
E˜Chom(p) is then given by E˜C
′′
hom(p) =
λπd2√
2πσβ
exp(−λπd2Ω(p)−
[ p−ǫ
β +Q−B − µ√
2σ
]2
)
×
(
2 + (C0 − p)
[ λπd2√
2πσβ
exp
(− [ p−ǫβ +Q−B − µ√
2σ
]2)
+
p−ǫ
β +Q−B − µ
σ2β
])
.
Under the condition of B+µ ≤ Q in Lemma 7.1, it is verified
that
2 + (C0 − p)
[
λπd2√
2πσβ
exp
(
− [ p−ǫβ +Q−B − µ√
2σ
]2)
+
p−ǫ
β +Q−B − µ
σ2β
]
≥ 0,
and hence E˜C
′′
hom(p) ≥ 0 for p ∈ [pth1, β(B + µ − Q +
2
√
2σ)]. By the non-negativeness of E˜C
′′
hom(p), it follows that
E˜Chom(p) is a convex function of p.
Next, based on the convexity of E˜Chom(p) in Lemma 7.1,
the unique minimum pˆ of E˜Chom(p) can be obtained by
solving the equation E˜C(pˆ) = 0. In addition, it holds that
E˜C
′
hom(pth1)
= −λπd
2(C0 − ǫ− β(B + µ−Q − 2
√
2σ)) exp(−4)√
2πσβ
< 0
E˜C
′
hom(ǫ+ β(B + µ−Q+ 2
√
2σ)) = 1− exp(−λπd2)
(
1+
λπd2(C0 − ǫ− β(B + µ−Q+ 2
√
2σ)) exp(−4)√
2πσβ
)
> 0
E˜C
′
hom(C0) = 1− exp(−λπd2) > 0. (52)
From (52), it follows that the global minimum pˆ ∈
[pth1,min{ǫ+β(B+µ−Q+2
√
2σ), C0}]. Besides, the value
of E˜C
′
hom(ǫ) = 1−exp(−λπd2Ω(ǫ))
(
1+ λπd
2(C0−ǫ)√
2πσβ
exp
(−[
Q−B−µ√
2σ
]2))
can either be negative or nonnegative. More
specifically, if E˜C
′
hom(ǫ) ≥ 0, then pˆ ≤ ǫ. On the other hand,
if E˜C
′
hom(ǫ) ≤ 0, then pˆ ≥ ǫ.
On the other hand, if B + µ > Q, it is not guaranteed that
E˜C
′′
hom(p) ≥ 0 for any p ∈ [pth1, β(B + µ−Q+ 2
√
2σ)]. It
thus implies that there may exist multiple candidate solutions
to E˜C
′
hom(p) = 0 for p ∈ [pth1, β(B + µ − Q + 2
√
2σ)]. In
this case, one can compute the corresponding expected cost
under different prices, and then select the best solution pˆ that
returns the minimal expected cost value.
Last, consider the cases of p−ǫ ≥ pth. Traveler T’s expected
cost EChom(p) = C0 + (p − C0)(1 − exp(−λπd2)) is an
increasing linear function of p, for which EChom(C0) = C0.
In addition, EChom(p) > E˜Chom(pth) for any p ≥ pth.
To summarize, the solution to minimize EChom(p) in the
range [ǫ, C0] is max{ǫ, pˆ} and Theorem 4.1 follows.
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E. Proof of Proposition 4.1
Define a function F (σ) = E˜Chom(p) with respect to σ > 0,
i.e.,
F (σ) = C0 + (p− C0)
(
1− exp(−λπd2Ω(p))
)
. (53)
The first-order derivative F ′(σ) = ∂F (σ)∂σ is then
F ′(σ) =− σ2(p− C0)λπd
2(p− ǫ+ β(Q −B − µ))√
2πβ
× exp
(
− λπd2Ω(p)−Υ2
)
, (54)
where Υ , p−ǫ+β(Q−B−µ)√
2σβ
. If B + µ ≤ Q, we can show that
F ′(σ) > 0 for any p ∈ [ǫ, C0] by checking each multiplication
factor in (54). Hence, the traveler’s expected cost EChom(p)
increases with the data usage variance. Proposition 4.1 thus
follows.
F. Proof of Theorem 4.2
For k = 1, . . . ,K , we define the following function
gk(p) , C0 + (p− C0)
(
1− exp(−
k∑
j=1
λjπd
2Ωj(p))
)
, (55)
where ǫ ≤ p ≤ C0. We first establish the convexity of gk(p)
under the condition B + µk ≤ Qk, k ∈ K. in the following
lemma.
Lemma 7.2: Suppose that B + µk ≤ Qk, k ∈ K. The
function gk(p) for any k ∈ K is a convex function of
p ∈ [ǫ, C0].
Proof: This lemma can be verified by checking the pos-
itiveness of the second-order derivative of gk(p) with respect
to p. The first-order derivative of gk(p) with p is given by
g′k(p) = 1− exp
(
−
k∑
j=1
λjπd
2Ωj(p)
)[
1
+
k∑
j=1
λjπd
2(C0 − p) exp(−(p−ǫ+βj(Qj−B−µj)√2σjβj )
2)
√
2πσjβj
]
,
and the second-order derivative of gk(p) is
g′′k (p) =
K∑
j=1
λjπd
2
√
2πσjβj
exp
(
−
k∑
j=1
λjπd
2Ωj(p)
−
[p− ǫ+ βj(Qj −B − µj)
2σ2jβ
2
j
]2)[
2 + (C0 − p)
×
K∑
j=1
(
λjπd
2
√
2πσjβj
exp
(
−
[p− ǫ+ βj(Qj −B − µj)
2σ2jβ
2
j
]2)
+
p− ǫ+ βj(Qj −B − µj)
2σ2kβ
2
j
)]
.
Under the condition of B+µj ≤ Qj , it follows that g′′k (p) ≥ 0
for any k ∈ K . As a result, the function gk(p), k ∈ K, is a
convex function of p ∈ [ǫ, C0], and thus lemma 7.2 follows.
Denote by p∗k the optimal solution to g
′
k(pk) = 0. Since that
g′k(ǫ) < 0 and g
′
k(C0) > 0, k ∈ K, it holds that ǫ ≤ p∗k ≤ C0,
k ∈ K.
On the other hand, if B+µk > Qk, k ∈ K, the convexity of
gk(p) is not guaranteed for p ∈ [ǫ, C0]. This implies that there
may exist multiple solutions to g′k(p) = 0 for p ∈ [ǫ, C0]. In
this case, one can compute the corresponding expected costs
under different price values via a one-dimensional exhaustive
search, and then select the best solution p∗k that returns the
minimum expected cost for traveler T.
Based on the above analysis, consider the case of C0 ≤ T1.
Since the pH data sharing probability Ωk(p) = 0, ∀k ∈ K,
traveler T has to pay roaming fee C0 to the WNO.
Next consider the case of Tk ≤ C0 ≤ Tk+1 for k =
1, . . . ,K − 1. Due to the fact that EChet(p) = gk(p) and
its convexity of gk(p) in the range [ǫ, C0], the unique solution
p∗k to minimize EChet(p) satisfies ǫ ≤ p∗k ≤ C0 ≤ Tk+1 in
this case.
For the case of T ≥ TK , we have EChet(p) = gK(p).
Based on the convexity of gK(p) and g
′
K(p
∗
K) = 0, it is clear
that p∗K is the optimal price for traveler T to minimize gK(p).
G. Derivations of PUB1
mul
(p) and PUB2
mul
(p)
We present the detailed calculation for obtaining the upper
bound expressions in (38) and (39) as follows.
P
UB1
mul
(p) =
∞∑
M=0
∞∑
N=1
N∑
Ny=1
(
N
Ny
)(
Ω(p)
)Ny(
1− Ω(p))N−Ny
× (λπd
2)N exp(−λπd2)
N !
(λtπd
2)M exp(−λtπd2)
M !
=
∞∑
M=0
∞∑
N=1
(
1− (1− Ω(p))N ) (λπd2)N exp(−λπd2)
N !
× (λtπd
2)M exp(−λtπd2)
M !
=
( ∞∑
N=1
(λπd2)N
N !
−
∞∑
N=1
((1 − Ω(p))λπd2)N
N !
)
× exp(−λπd2)
( ∞∑
M=0
(λtπd
2)M
M !
)
exp(−λtπd2)
=
(
exp(λπd2)− exp((1− Ω(p))λπd2)
)
exp(−λπd2)
= 1− exp(((1 − Ω(p))− 1)λπd2), (56)
where the fourth equality of (56) follows from the
fact that
∑∞
N=1 (λπd
2)N/N ! = exp(λπd2) − 1,∑∞
N=1 ((1 − Ω(p))λπd2)N/N ! = exp((1 − Ω(p))λπd2)− 1,
and
∑∞
M=0(λtπd
2)M/M ! = exp(λtπd
2).
Likewise, for PUB2
mul
(p) in (39), we have
P
UB2
mul
(p) =
∞∑
M=0
∞∑
N=1
∑N
Ny=1
Ny
(
N
Ny
)
(Ω(p))Ny (1 − Ω(p))N−Ny
M + 1
× (λπd
2)N exp(−λπd2)
N !
(λtπd
2)M exp(−λtπd2)
M !
=
( ∞∑
N=1
Ω(p)N
(λπd2)N exp(−λπd2)
N !
)
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×
( ∞∑
M=0
(λtπd
2)M exp(−λtπd2)
(M + 1)!
)
= λqΩ(p)πd2 exp(−λπd2)
( ∞∑
N=1
(λπd2)N−1
(N − 1)!
)
×
(
exp(−λtπd2)
λtπd2
∞∑
M=0
(λtπd
2)M+1
(M + 1)!
)
= λΩ(p)πd2 exp(−λπd2) exp(λπd2)exp(−λtπd
2)
λtπd2
× ( exp(λtπd2)− 1)
=
λΩ(p)
(
1− exp(−λtπd2)
)
λt
, (57)
where the second equation of (57) follows from the fact
that
∑N
n=1 n
(
N
n
)
xn(1 − x)N−n = Nx for 0 < x <
1, and the fourth equation of (57) holds from the fact
that
∑∞
M=0(λtπd
2)M+1/(M + 1)! = exp(λtπd
2) − 1 and∑∞
N=1 (λπd
2)N−1/(N − 1)! = exp(λπd2).
H. Proof of lemma 5.1
First, we prove the function f(p) has a unique solution p˜,
where p ∈ [ǫ, C0], and f(p) is defined as
f(p) , PUB2mul (p)× p+ (1− PUB2mul (p))× C0
= C0 +
λΩ(p)(1 − exp(−λtπd2))
λt
(p− C0). (58)
The first-order derivative of f(p) with respect to p is given as
f ′(p) =
λ(1− exp(−λtπd2))
λt
(
Ω(p)
+
1√
2πσβ
exp
(− [p− ǫ+ β(Q −B − µ)√
2σβ
]2)
(p− C0)
)
.
Suppose that f ′(p˜) = 0. Let p = p˜ − ∆ where 0 < ∆ <
p˜ − ǫ. Then ǫ < p < p˜. The first-order derivative of exp ( −[
p−ǫ+β(Q−B−µ)√
2σβ
]2 )
(p− C0) of p ∈ [ǫ, C0] is positive, i.e.,
exp
(
−
[p− ǫ+ β(Q −B − µ)√
2σβ
]2)
+ (C0 − p)p− ǫ+ β(Q −B − µ)
σ2β2
> 0, (59)
it follows that exp
(− [p−ǫ+β(Q−B−µ)√
2σβ
]2)
(p−C0) < exp
(−[ p˜1−ǫ+β(Q−B−µ)√
2σβ
]2)
(p˜1−C0). Furthermore, together with the
monotonically increasing t(p) of p, we have f ′(p) < f ′(p˜).
Likewise, letting p = p˜+∆ where 0 < ∆ < C0− p˜, we have
f ′(p) > f ′(p˜) = 0.
Based on above analysis for f ′(p) of p ∈ [ǫ, C0], it is veri-
fied that p˜ is the unique solution to minimize f(p). Then, by
checking f ′(Ω−1(λt/λ)) < 0, it follows that p˜ > Ω−1(λt/λ).
Taking into account the constraint of ǫ ≤ p ≤ Ω−1(λt/λ), the
optimal solution is thus p∗mul = Ω
−1(λt/λ).
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